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1. Introduction
One of the most puzzling recent trends is that male schooling has recently
lagged behind female education attainment. In an important study, Goldin et
al.(2006) found that if women represented only 39% of U.S. undergraduates in
1960, within four decades they made up the majority of U.S. college students
and of those graduating with a bachelor’s degree. The trend is by no means
limited to the U.S. The same study reported that, while school enrollment rates
of women in 17 OECD countries were in the mid-80’s below those of men, by
2002 women’s college enrollment rates exceeded those of men in 15 of these
countries.
In order to isolate the main mechanism we are interested in, we provide
an equilibrium model of inter-linked frictional labour and marriage markets,
with focus on men’s choice of schooling investment. Education enhances not
only the labour market returns of men (improved wage offers) but also, through
this, their marriage prospects. We establish the existence and investigate the
properties of a market equilibrium where some men choose to invest in education
and women are selective about whom they marry. Crucially, we show that an
increase in single women’s labour market options (viewed as a proxy for their
educational attainment) leads to a decrease in the equilibrium fraction of men
who invest in schooling.
Our model is underpinned by the well known fact that couples tend to sort
according to various traits (See Becker (1991)). In our paper, as all men are
ex-ante homogeneous, the only relevant differentiating trait they bring to the
marriage market is their wage, which in turn is affected by an ex-ante educa-
tional choice. Furthermore, as the study of equilibrium class formation is not
one of the objectives of the present paper, the sorting aspect in our frictional
marriage market essentially boils down to women having a reservation strategy.
This setup requires the use of two important modelling devices.
First, with earned wages being the only distinguishing male trait in the mar-
riage market, a single woman will only accept a single employed man if his wage
is higher than a particular (endogenous) threshold wage. Consequently, a sin-
gle unemployed man is involved in a so-called constrained sequential job search
problem, whereby his marriage market prospects (marriageability) depend on
his earnings, and therefore his labour market strategy is adjusted accordingly.
That is, before being able to consider the question of male schooling investment,
one has to characterise the optimal reservation wage policy of an unemployed
single man, which is now a function of the threshold wage set by women. Second,
in order to obtain such a meaningful female reservation wage in the frictional
marriage market, we include as a parameter the flow utility of being single for
a woman, which is meant to capture her labour market options and returns
- possibly augmented through some ex-ante (not modelled here) educational
investment. We assume that upon marriage women give up this flow value,
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there is no intra-marital bargaining, and the wage earned by the man becomes
a public good for the marital partnership.
Some comments about the latter set of assumptions. First, in our model we
consider direct selection into marriage based on the wage of a man. Grossbard-
Shechtman and Neuman (2003) emphasise the importance of this ”breadwinner”
effect, while Ludwig and Bru¨derl (2018) provide recent empirical evidence of
selection into marriage on wage levels and growth. Second, as our focus is on
the effect of an increase in female returns/education on the fraction of men who
invest in schooling, in this paper we choose to proxy the labour market returns
of women with their flow utility outside marriage - just like in Blau et al. (2000).
Of course this is a much more general parameter that could also be interpreted as
a measure of women’s (and, by comparison, men’s) attitudes towards marriage,
able to capture possible asymmetries in terms of how they perceive the gains
from marriage. For example, the empirical results in Gould and Paserman
(2003) suggest that men do not seem to care much about their partner’s wage.
In turn, Blundell et al. (2016) show that female attachment to the labour
market weakens considerably after marriage, while Gould and Paserman (2003)
among others provide evidence that women build this into their expectations
and behaviour in the marriage market. Finally, the assumption that couples do
not negotiate over the surplus from marriage simplifies the analysis: it does not
qualitatively affect the nature of men’s constrained job search decision, and it
allows us to side-step the well-understood question of inefficiency in frictional
markets generated by the hold-up problem.
Given this framework, our main result that an increase in female labour
market returns (educational attainement) decreases the proportion of men who
invest in education has the following intuitive explanation: In essence, we have
a two-stage game in which first single unemployed men choose whether or not
to invest in schooling, then this is followed by the interaction in the joint labour
and marriage markets. In the latter subgame women and men simultaneously
set their reservation wages, women taking as given the fraction of educated
men. The partial search equilibrium in the inter-linked frictional markets de-
termines the returns to education for men, both in terms of wages and marriage
prospects. For any given cost of schooling, and with a binary education decision
problem, a market equilibrium in which a fraction of men choose to undertake
the schooling investment requires that the returns to education equals the cost
of education. Crucially, it is the proportion of educated men that adjusts so
that this market equilibrium condition holds. To see this, consider an increase
in female labour market returns. Women become pickier in the marriage market
and increase their reservation wage, but overall only the partial equilibrium of
the joint frictional markets is affected directly. Importantly, with a fixed cost
of schooling, the equilibrium returns from education for males needs to remain
unchanged. Since a change in the fraction of educated men active in the fric-
tional markets affects the female reservation wage in the same direction as a
change in female labour market returns, it follows that if these returns increase,
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the fraction of educated men needs to decrease in order to restore the market
equilibrium condition.
Our result is surprisingly robust and, apart from offering an explanation
for the puzzling trend documented in Goldin et al. (2006) and others, it also
seems to be in line with several other empirical findings. In terms of women’s
attitudes in the marriage market, Gould and Paserman (2003) conclude that
women are pickier if female wages (their proxy for women’s value of being single)
are higher. Similarly, Blau et al. (2000) find that higher labour market returns
for females has lead to lower marriage rates for women between ages 16-24 and
25-34. Finally, Oppenheimer (1988) and Oppenheimer and Lew (1995) argue
that an improvement in labour market gains for women leads to them delaying
the timing of marriage.
This paper is part of a research agenda whose main message is that many
observed outcomes in labour markets (including human capital accumulation)
can very well be the result of individuals’ considerations and expectations in the
marriage market - and vice-versa. As such, the present work builds on Bonilla
and Kiraly (2013) and Bonilla et al. (2019), where the concept of constrained
sequential job search was introduced and analysed in detail. For the specific
question of the male-female schooling gap, our work complements the impor-
tant contribution by Chiappori et al. (2009), who offer an explanation that also
stresses the link between the marriage market and labour market.1 However,
their model is completely different from ours, as it investigates stable mar-
riage assignments in a frictionless environment with transferable utility within
couples, and their focus is on what determines women’s educational choice, and
when would it be likely to lag behind or overtake that of men’s. In terms of mod-
els with a frictional labour market, Flinn and Mullins (2015) introduce endoge-
nous productivity-enhancing schooling in a Pissarides-type general equilibrium
model augmented with on-the-job search and potential wage renegotiations.
2. The Model
We consider steady state equilibria of an economy that consists of a contin-
uum of risk neutral men and women, where all agents discount the future at
rate r.
Men enter the economy unemployed, single and of type L. The distribu-
tion of wages faced by them is FL(.) with continuous support [wL, wL]. Men
have a choice whether to enter the labour market immediately, or undertake
an investment in education at a given cost c, same for all. An individual who
undertakes the schooling investment becomes a type H man who now faces a
1See also Browning et al. (2014).
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wage distribution FH(.) with support [wH , wH ]. We assume that FH(.) first
order stochastically dominates FL(.), so one can think of male types as repre-
senting educational attainment. Following the education decision, all men (H
and L) become active in both the labour market and the marriage market. In
the labour market, they look for wage offers using costless random sequential
search, and job opportunities arrive at rate λ0. If employed at wage w, a man
receives the flow payoff w, and we assume there is no on-the-job search. While
active in the labour market, single men also use costless sequential search in
order to look for partners in the frictional marriage market. Marriage requires
mutual acceptance, and we assume that divorce is not possible. For a man,
marriage confers a flow payoff y which captures the non-economic utility of the
partnership. Overall therefore, a married man employed at wage w has a flow
payoff w + y.
Women enter the economy single, and let x > 0 denote the flow payoff of a
single woman. This parameter is crucial for our investigation, as it captures a
woman’s options outside marriage. Here, we interpret this as her career oppor-
tunities, so an increase in x would mean higher labour market returns, possibly
due to higher ex-ante schooling. Single women look for males using costless
sequential search, but (as we will show) they are not interested in marrying un-
employed men. Hence, for them the relevant wage distribution is that of wages
earned by single type i men (i = L,H), denoted by Gi(.). Once a marriage
partnership is formed, a married woman simply enjoys a flow utility equal to
her partner’s wage.
Since for both sexes utilities are monotonic in wages, with sequential search,
the optimal strategies for both women and men are characterised by the reser-
vation property. Let Ri denote the reservation wage of unemployed type i men
in the labour market. Similarly, let Ti denote the reservation wage of women in
the marriage market, meaning an employed man of type i is marriageable only
if his wage is no lower than Ti.
Everyone (irrespective of employment- and marital status) leaves the econ-
omy at rate δ. Let Γ denote the exogenous flow (measure) of new (unem-
ployed and single) men who enter the economy at every instance, and let Ni
denote the number of marriageable employed single men of type i. Similarly,
let n denote the measure of single women; it is exogenous as we assume that
a new single woman comes into the market every time a single woman gets
married or exits the economy. Denote by λiw the rate at which a single woman
meets an eligible bachelor, and let λm denote the rate at which single men
meet single women. We assume a quadratic matching function with param-
eter λ that measures the efficiency of the matching process. Then, we have
λiw =
λ(NH+NL)n
n
Ni
(NH+NL)
= λNi, and λm =
λ(NH+NL)n
(NH+NL)
= λn, where both
Ni and λ
i
w are of course endogenous. Crucially, let τ denote the (endogenous)
proportion of male entrants who decide to invest in schooling. We ask how does
the steady state equilibrium fraction of educated men change with x.
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3. Steady state and optimal search
3.1. Unemployed men, marriageable men and wages
Let ui denote the number of unemployed men of type i. In steady state we
require ΓτH = uH [δ + λ0(1 − Fi(Ri))]. That is, the inflow of unemployed men
who choose to invest in schooling needs to equal the outflow of these educated
unemployed, either into employment (at an acceptable wage) or full exit.
Consequently, in steady state we have:
uH =
τΓ
δ + λ0 [1− FH(RH)] ,
and
uL =
(1− τ)Γ
δ + λ0 [1− FL(RL)] .
In order to obtain the number of single marriageable men of type i, we
require
uiλ0[1− Fi(Ti)] = Ni(λn+ δ).
Then, using ui as above, we obtain:
NH =
τΓ
δ + λ [1− FH(RH)]
λ0[1− FH(TH)]
λn+ δ
and
NL =
(1− τ)Γ
δ + λ [1− FL(RL)]
λ0[1− FL(TL)]
λn+ δ
.
Note the role of ui in the determination of Ni. We will show that when
the marriage market affects unemployed men’s search behaviour, there are two
possible outcomes:
(i) When Ri < Ti the number of marriageable men increases with Ri. Given
the exogenous wage distributions, if the reservation wages Ri increase, men of
type i leave unemployment at a lower rate, so the steady state ui increases.
Then, since the rate at which men accept marriageable wages remains un-
changed, this leads to an increase in Ni. Furthermore, Ni increases when the
female reservation wage Ti decreases. (ii) When Ri is optimally set equal to Ti
an increase in Ri results in a decrease in Ni.
Finally, the distribution of wages earned by marriageable men of type i is
given by the steady state condition:
uiλ0[Fi(w)− Fi(Ti)] = Gi(w)Ni(λn+ δ).
In the above, the number of marriageable men of type i with wages no higher
than w is Gi(w)Ni, and they leave this stock if they get married or exit the
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economy altogether. The left-hand side captures the flow of unemployed men of
type i who find and accept a job with a wage that confers marriageability but
is no higher than w.
From here, also using the solution for Ni previously obtained, we have:
Gi(w) =
Fi(w)− Fi(Ti)
1− Fi(Ti) .
3.2. Optimal search: women
In this section, we derive the female reservation wages Ti. To do this, we first
establish that women refuse to marry unemployed men of type i if the female
reservation wage is high enough.2 Consider a married and employed man of
type i. Without the possibility of either on-the-job search or divorce, standard
considerations give the discounted expected lifetime utility of such a man:
VMi (w) =
w + y
r + δ
.
Although this utility is clearly independent of type (education), in the in-
terest of clarity we will continue to use the subscripts whenever we refer to this
value of employment.
Now consider a married but unemployed man of type i. As he is no longer
active in the marriage market, his reservation wage is simply the standard pure
labour market one:
Ri =
λ0
r + δ
wi∫
Ri
[1− Fi(w)] dw (1)
Note that RH > RL because type H men have better job prospects in the
labour market. Furthermore, as we will show later, Ri is in fact the lowest
reservation wage for each type.3
In principle, women could of course marry unemployed men as well. Let us
therefore examine the situation of a woman who is married to a type i jobless
man. Her value function WUi is given by:
(r + δ)WUi = λ0
wi∫
R
i
[
WMi (w)−WUi
]
dFi(w),
2This particular bit of analysis mirrors to some extent the one carried out in Bonilla et
al. (2019), with the crucial difference that in this paper male types (here education) are
endogenous.
3In Bonilla et al. (2019), Ri is the same for all types.
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where WMi (w) = w/(r+δ) is the discounted lifetime utility of being married
to a type i employed man who earns wage w. The above equation incorporates
the fact that a married type i unemployed man has reservation wage Ri.
For Ti to be a female reservation wage, it needs to satisfy the condition
WUi = Ti/(r + δ). Given W
M
i (w) above, we have:
Ti =
λ0
r + δ
wi∫
R
i
[w − Ti] dFi(w),
and the unique solution to this is Ti = Ri. Now, if a woman’s value of
being single (denoted by WS) increases, her reservation wage also increases. In
contrast, WUi is independent of Ti. Hence, W
SWUi if and only if TiRi, and
therefore we conclude that if Ti > Ri, women will reject marriage to a type
i unemployed man. Throughout, we work under the assumption that this is
indeed the case.4
Next, we turn to the actual derivation of women’s reservation wages Ti,
emphasising that women cannot direct their search efforts and therefore con-
tact with an H or an L man is completely random. Importantly, WMH (w) =
WML (w) = w/(r+ δ): for a woman, the type of an employed man she is already
married to is irrelevant. Using the definition of a reservation value we have
WS = WMH (TH) = W
M
L (TL), which implies TH = TL. Consequently, from now
on we drop the subscripts and use T (= TH = TL) instead.
Recall that WS denotes the value of being single for a woman. Standard
derivations lead to the Bellman equation:
(r+δ)WS = x+ λNH
wH∫
T
[
WMH (w)−WS
]
dGH(w) +
+ λNL
wL∫
T
[
WML (w)−WS
]
dGL(w).
Making use of the solutions for Ni and Gi(w) previously obtained, this be-
comes:
(r+δ)WS = x+ λτΓλ0[δ+λ(1−FH(RH))](λn+δ)
wH∫
T
[
WMH (w)−WS
]
dFH(w) +
+ λτL
λ(1−τ)Γλ0
[δ+λ(1−FL(RL))](λn+δ)
wL∫
T
[
WML (w)−WS
]
dFL(w).
4By doing so, we essentially eliminate the uninteresting equilibrium where the marriage
market does not affect men’s job search.
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Finally, using WS = T/(r + δ) and applying standard integration by parts,
we obtain:
T = x+
λτΓλ0
[δ + λ(1− FH(RH))](λn+ δ)
wH∫
T
[1− FH(w)]dw+ (2)
+
λ(1− τ)Γλ0
(δ + λ [1− FL(RL)])(λn+ δ)
wL∫
T
[1− FL(w)]dw.
At this point, we make three observations that are important for what fol-
lows:
1. Clearly, ∂T/∂x > 0: as expected, women raise their reservation wage in
the marriage market if their instantaneous utility from staying single increases.
2. ∂T/∂τ > 0: intuitively, a ceteris paribus increase in the fraction of edu-
cated men with better job prospects makes women pickier, since their marriage
market prospects have also improved now.
3. ∂T/∂Ri > 0: again, ceteris paribus, a higher reservation wage of type i
men increases the number of marriageable men (see the discussion around Ni
above), so women can afford to become choosier.
3.3. Optimal search: men
We are interested in equilibria in which the marriage market affects all men’s
decisions in the labour market. Nevertheless, it is instructive to consider the
optimal job search behaviour of men under all possible circumstances. To that
end, first recall that in any scenario where the marriage market does not influ-
ence labour market decisions, the male reservation wage is given by Ri obtained
above.
When the marriage market does have an effect (through T ) on male strate-
gies, single unemployed men undertake a so-called constrained search, knowing
that by accepting a particular wage (for life), they either become marriageable
or loose the prospect of marriage forever. As a consequence, a man of type i
searches from the wage offer distribution Fi(.) and, for any given female reser-
vation wage T which makes him acceptable for marriage, he uses a reservation
wage function Ri(T ).
In what follows, we fully characterise the function Ri(T ). Although the
derivation of the reservation wage function is the same for both types5, the
actual reservation wage functions will be different across types, essentially due
5For a much more detailed exposition of this, please consult Bonilla et al. (2019).
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to the fact that men with different schooling choices face different wage distri-
butions. The main insight is that this function is non-monotonic in the female
reservation wage, and has a unique maximum, attained at T = T̂i, where the
latter is defined by:
T̂i ≡ λ0
r + δ
 wi∫
T̂i
[1− Fi(w)] dw +
λn
[
1− Fi(T̂i)
]
r + δ + λn
y
 . (3)
Clearly, for y > 0 and Fi(T̂i) < 1, we have T̂i > Ri.
The formal reasoning is as follows. Overall, a man (of either type) can be
in one of three states: unemployed and single, employed at wage w and single
(S), or employed at wage w and married (M). Denote a type i man’s value of
being unemployed by Ui, and let V
S
i (w) describe the value of being single and
earning a wage w. Standard derivations lead to the Bellman equation for a type
i unemployed man:
(r + δ)Ui = λ0
wi∫
w
i
max
[
V Si (w)− Ui, 0
]
dFi(w).
Anticipating that V Si (w) is not a continuous function (see below), we can
define:
Ri(T ) ≡ min
{
w : V Si (w) ≥ Ui
}
.
Since there is no divorce, the value of being married and earning a wage w
is VMi (w) = (w + y)/(r + δ). Hence, for any T , we have:
V S(w) =
{
w
r+δ if w < T
w
r+δ +
λn
(r+δ+λn)(r+δ)y if w ≥ T
}
.
Please note that when λn = 0 (i.e. no marriage market), we have V Si (w) =
w/(r + δ) for all w and, from Ui = V
S
i (Ri), standard manipulation yields Ri =
Ri. As stated before, this is the reservation wage that would be chosen by a
hypothetical unemployed married man since, without divorce, this man is no
longer involved in the marriage market.
The Proposition below presents the full characterisation of the male reser-
vation wage function.
Proposition 1. The reservation wage function Ri(T ) is continuous, piece-wise
differentiable, and:
(a) Ri = Ri for T ≤ Ri and T > wi;
(b) Ri = T for T ∈ (Ri, T̂i];
(c) Ri < T and decreasing for T ∈ (T̂i, wi].
Furthermore, T̂H > T̂L and RH > RL.
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Proof. See Appendix.
In essence, when the marriage market affects men’s job search strategy, un-
employed males can react in two ways. For relatively low values of female
reservation wages, they choose to hold out for such wages and set Ri equal to
T . At the critical T̂i the labour market related cost of holding out for it equals
the gains from the marriage market. For even higher female reservation wages
men gradually give up on trying to match T , so they only get married if they are
lucky and land a high enough wage. This is because higher and higher female
reservation wages make it less and less likely to encounter a marriageable wage,
so the male reservation wage decreases.
Two further observations follow. First, men’s value of unemployment Ui
is not directly affected by x, so ∂Ri(T )/∂x = 0 as women’s flow utility of
being single does not affect the male reservation wage functions. However, note
that x will of course affect the equilibrium male reservation wages, through its
direct effect on the female reservation wage function T . Second, the value of
unemployment is not directly affected by τ either, so ∂Ri/∂τ = 0.
4. Equilibrium
In this section we investigate the existence and properties of a market equi-
librium by first looking at the partial search equilibrium in the joint frictional
markets, and then (using backward induction), pinning down the steady state
fraction of educated men that is consistent with optimal schooling investment
choices. Intuitively, as they face a binary decision, men will choose to invest
in schooling as long as the returns from education - as captured here by the
difference in the values of educated and uneducated single unemployed men,
is higher than the cost of schooling. A mixed equilibrium with a fraction of
educated men therefore requires ∆U(≡ UH − UL) = c, meaning all males are
indifferent between investing or not in schooling.
The exogenous parameter x plays a key role in the determination of the
partial equilibrium in the labour and marriage markets. In their behaviour
in these inter-linked frictional markets agents also take τ as given. Crucially
however, τ is the only endogenous variable that can adjust to ensure the equality
of returns to education and cost of schooling.
The central results of our paper concern the nature of the interaction be-
tween these two variables. To get a flavour of the argument, consider a change
in the flow utility of single women, x. This generates a change in T (RH , RL)
only - recall that the value of unemployment and reservation wages of men is
not directly affected. However, the shift in T (RH , RL) itself has an immediate
impact on UH and UL, due to the change in the proportion of marriageable
11
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wages (different across male types). This leads to an adjustment in male reser-
vation wages and with that, also a change in the returns to education. With
comparative statics in mind recall that, just like for x, we have ∂Ui/∂τ = 0 so
τ affects T (RH , RL) only. Therefore, τ is indeed the only endogenous variable
that can adjust in order to restore ∆U to its equilibrium level. Subsequent
analysis of the adjustment of τ following a shock in x lead to further insights
about the robustness of our equilibrium.
4.1. Partial search equilibrium
First, note that the number of steady-state educated single unemployed men
(uH) is essentially determined by the proportion of men who decide to invest in
schooling, τ . Taking these two measures as given, a search equilibrium for the
inter-linked frictional markets is the triplet {R∗L, R∗H , T ∗} together with steady
state conditions, such that male reservation wages satisfy Proposition 1 and
the female reservation wage satisfies (2). There are three types of potential
equilibria: Type 1, characterised by R∗i < T
∗, R∗L < R
∗
H and ∂Ri/∂T < 0;
Type 2, characterised by R∗H = T
∗, R∗L < T
∗ and ∂RL/∂T < 0; and Type 3,
with R∗i = T
∗.
Proposition 2. A partial search equilibrium exists and it is unique. In any
such equilibrium ∂T ∗/∂x > 0 and ∂T ∗/∂τ > 0.
Proof. To show existence, note that Ri(T ) is continuous and non-monotonic
in T , while T (Ri) is continuous and increasing in Ri.
The second statement is proved by contradiction. Consider a potential Type
1 equilibrium. Let x increase, and assume a resulting new equilibrium with a
lower T ∗. Since ∂Ri/δT < 0 while the reservation wage of a particular male
type is not directly affected by the reservation wage of the other type, this
would necessarily involve higher R∗i . From (2), a higher x, together with a
higher R∗i unambiguously results in a higher female reservation wage, which is
a contradiction. Consider next a potential Type 3 equilibrium, and increase x.
Imposing R∗i = T
∗ in (2) we have ∂T/∂x > 0, and therefore a new equilibrium
with a lower T ∗ would be a contradiction. Finally, consider a potential Type 2
equilibrium, and increase x. Given that ∂RL/∂T < 0 and R
∗
H is optimally set
equal to T ∗, the above two arguments once again imply that a new equilibrium
with a lower T ∗ would be a contradiction.
The reasoning which proves that ∂T ∗/∂x > 0 also implies that the female
reservation wage function implicitly given in (2) crosses the 45 degree line from
below, and hence the uniqueness of equilibrium follows. Finally, an increase in
τ shifts the female reaction function in (2) to the right. QED
Although hidden, the role played by Ni in the results above is worth stress-
ing. For the Type 1 equilibrium, an increase in Ri leads to an increase in Ni,
which (ceteris paribus) makes women pickier. This, coupled with an increase in
12
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x must result in a higher female reservation wage. For an equilibrium of Type
2 with R∗i = T
∗, a lower equilibrium female reservation wage would mean a
higher Ni. But the combined effect of both a higher Ni and a higher x is that
single women become pickier.
Panel (a) in Figure 1 captures a Type 1 partial search equilibrium for the
joint labour and marriage markets, with the female reservation wage graphed
against the reservation wage of educated men. Panel (b) captures the same par-
tial search equilibrium, but this time with the female reservation wage graphed
against the reservation wage of uneducated men.
Note that in Panel (b) the female reservation wage (graphed against RL) is po-
sitioned more to the right compared to the case depicted in Panel (a), where it
is graphed against RH . This configuration always holds for RH > RL.
Finally, we are now also in the position to describe the range of the parameter
x for which different types of equilibria obtain. To this end, define x1, x2, x3,
and x4 such that T
∗(x1) = RH , T
∗(x2) = T̂L, T ∗(x3) = T̂H , and T ∗(x3) = wL.
Then, for x ∈ (x3, x4] a Type 1 equilibrium exists; for x ∈ (x2, x3] a Type 2
equilibrium exists, while a Type 3 equilibrium exists for x ∈ (x1, x2].
4.2. Market equilibrium with schooling
Our focus is on a mixed market equilibrium characterised by (i) a Type 1
partial search equilibrium in the joint frictional markets and (ii) a fraction of
men who choose schooling. Men will choose to invest in schooling as long as
∆U ≡ UH −UL > c, and hence a necessary condition for an interior equilibrium
is that ∆U = c, so all men are indifferent between paying or not for education.
Because in a Type 1 partial search equilibrium Ui = Ri/(r + δ) the above
condition for such a mixed market equilibrium amounts to:
∆R∗(≡ R∗H −R∗L) = (r + δ)c.
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Clearly, this equality pins down the value of returns to education required
for an equilibrium. Since ∂Ri(T )/∂T < 0 for T > T̂H , while ∂RL(T )/∂RH =
∂RH(T )/∂RL = 0, we can write ∆R = ∆R(T ). Therefore, the above equa-
tion also pins down the equilibrium value(s) of T , and with it the associated
equilibrium values of RH and RL.
6.
Suppose for now that there are several equilibrium female reservation wages
which satisfy the equality between returns and costs of education. Say there
are k such values of T , so that ∆R(Tj) = (r+ δ)c, with j = 1, 2, ...k. Then, the
necessary and sufficient condition for a mixed market equilibrium requires that
the female reservation wage that emerges from the partial search equilibrium
coincides with one of the female reservation wages that ensures the equality of
education returns and costs. That is, T ∗ = Tj for some j = 1, 2, ...k. In turn,
this equilibrium T ∗ pins down the equilibrium male reservation wages R∗H and
R∗L, and thus the market equilibrium returns to education ∆R
∗.
Although the proportion of men who choose to invest in schooling is endoge-
nous in the overall market equilibrium, it acts as a parameter in the determina-
tion of T ∗ in the partial search equilibrium, so we have T ∗(x, τ). That is, there
needs to be a τj such that:
T ∗(x, τj) = Tj (4)
Denoting by τ∗j the equilibrium value of this endogenous variable, we want to
know how does an increase in single women’s flow utility affect the equilibrium
fraction of men who invest in schooling. To carry out this comparative statics
exercise, consider equilibrium condition (4), and an increase in x. Note that an
increase in x affects the triplet {R∗H , R∗L, T ∗} through its direct effect on T (Ri)
only. Ceteris paribus, women are pickier in the marriage market. As T shifts,
the male reservation wages of both types decrease, thereby changing the returns
to education. But then the equilibrium condition (4) does not hold, and only
a lower fraction of men who invest in education can ensure T = Tj . Our main
result below formalises this argument:
Theorem 1. Consider a mixed market equilibrium (MME) with T ∗ = Tj,
characterised by:
(i) x ∈ (x3, x4],
(ii) R∗i as in Proposition 1(c),
(iii) T ∗ given by (2),
(iv) τ∗j ∈ (0, 1) solving (4).
Then, ∂τ∗j /∂x < 0.
Proof. Condition (4) holds in an MME. Recall that x and τ are both
parameters in the partial search equilibrium that determines T ∗ and hence
6If ∆R is monotonic in T (and this of course depends on the distribution functions Fi),
the condition in fact pins down a unique equilibrium triplet.
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∆R∗. For (4) to hold after an increase in x, there must be a change in τ such
that dT ∗(x, τ) = 0, so that in turn the returns to education remain unchanged
(d∆R∗ = 0). Total differentiation of T ∗ yields dT ∗(x, τ) = ∂T
∗
∂x dx +
∂T∗
∂τ dτ .
Since ∂T ∗/∂x > 0 (see Proposition 2), an increase in x leads to a higher T ∗, so
∂T∗
∂x dx > 0. Hence, dT
∗(x, τ) = 0 only if ∂T
∗
∂τ dτ < 0. As ∂T
∗/∂τ > 0 (again,
see Proposition 2), this in turn requires ∂τ/∂x < 0. QED
The result that the effect of an increase in x on the equilibrium proportion
of men who choose education is negative follows because, while a change in x
alters the actual returns to education through its effect on T , it clearly does not
alter the cost of schooling, and hence neither does it affect the value of T that
is consistent with the equilibrium. This, together with the fact that both x and
τ affect T positively, delivers our main result.
Recall that the result in Theorem 1 applies to each of the possible mixed
market equilibria, where T ∗ = Tj and τ = τ∗j . Assume we are in such an equi-
librium. The way men actually change their schooling decision after a change
in x determines the actual direction of adjustment of τ . In particular, note that
an increase in T has a negative effect on all men: it leads to a decrease in the
proportion of available marriageable wages, with this decrease being different
across male types. Indeed, we have ∂∆R/∂T < 0 if the negative effect of an
increase in T is stronger for H than for L type men, that is:
∂FH(T )
∂T
>
r + δ + λ0[1− FL(RL)]
r + δ + λ0[1− FH(RH)]
∂FL(T )
∂T
(5)
Intuitively, the returns to education diminish as the female reservation wage
increases if the increase in the proportion of unmarriageable wages in the dis-
tribution FH(.) faced by educated men is high enough relative to that in the
distribution faced by uneducated men FL(.), where ”high enough” takes into ac-
count the fact that the female reservation wage affects employment probabilities
through its effect on male reservation wages.
Given this, we obtain the following result.
Proposition 3. Consider a mixed market equilibrium (MME) with T ∗ = Tj.
(i) If inequality (5) holds, an increase in x leads to either an MME with
same T ∗and a lower proportion of educated men, or a corner solution with no
educated men.
(ii) If the inequality (5) holds in the opposite direction, an increase in x leads
to either an MME with a higher T ∗ and a higher proportion of educated men,
or a corner solution with no uneducated men.
Proof. In the MME we have ∆R∗(T ∗(x, τ)) = (r + δ)c. An increase in
x leads to an increase in T ∗. When (5) holds we have ∂∆R/∂T < 0, and
therefore now ∆R(T ) < (r + δ)c, so τ adjusts downwards (reversing T to T ∗)
until either the original equilibrium is restored or a corner solution emerges,
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with τ = 0. When (5) holds in the opposite direction, ∂∆R/∂T > 0, and hence
∆R(T ) > (r+ δ)c, so τ adjusts upwards, thus increasing T even further. If ∆R
is monotonic, this process continues until τ = 1; if ∆R is not monotonic, it is
possible that the equilibrium condition ∆R∗(T ∗(x, τ)) = (r + δ)c is met for a
different T ∗(= Tj+1). QED
We can now spell out in detail and interpret the chain of reactions that fol-
low a positive shock in women’s options outside marriage. Recall that, in our
model, such a shock is meant to capture changes in female labour market returns
that are either partly or entirely due to enhanced schooling investment on their
part. The immediate effect of any such change is that women become pickier
in the marriage market. In turn, the resulting increase in the female reserva-
tion wage has an adverse effect on the men active in the marriage market, as
it leads to a decrease in the proportion of marriageable wages, for both edu-
cated and uneducated single men. Unemployed men adjust their labour market
strategy, with all males reducing their reservation wages. If the increase in x
harms (through the subsequent increase in T ) the marriage market prospects
of educated men relatively more than those of uneducated men, so the former
reduce their reservation wage more than the latter, the respective changes in
male reservation wages add up to a decrease in the returns to schooling. Now
the returns to schooling are too low. Hence, the fraction of men who under-
take investment in education decreases. At this point, the countervailing effect
kicks in. With fewer educated men around, women become less picky, and the
associated decrease in the female reservation wage continues until it reaches its
old level. Only then will men be once again indifferent between acquiring or
not education. Interestingly, this transition mechanism suggests that if women
experience a positive shock in the labour market (higher returns, possibly due
to increased educational attainment), this is entirely offset by a negative effect
on the marriage market, where their prospects suffer as the pool of educated
eligible men shrinks.
It is also possible to end up in a corner solution with no educated men.
Nonetheless, women are now better off because the initial positive effect of an
increase in their labour market returns is not fully eroded by the deterioration
in their marriage market prospects.
In turn, if the increase in x harms the marriage market prospects of unedu-
cated men relatively more than those of educated men, the respective changes
in male reservation wages add up to an increase in the returns to schooling.
This makes women even more picky, but men respond and the proportion of
educated men increases further, in a virtuous cycle. Whether this leads to dif-
ferent type of equilibrium with no uneducated men, or stops at another mixed
market equilibrium, the women are always better off.
Finally, what about the other two types of possible mixed market equilibria,
characterised by Type 2 and Type 3 partial search equilibria? In terms of
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existence and uniqueness, the exact same arguments as before apply, suitably
adjusted by substituting Ui for Ri/(r + δ). Furthermore, it can also be shown
that ∂FH(T )/∂T > ∂FL(T )/∂T is now a sufficient condition for a decrease in
returns to education following an increase in female reservation wage.
5. Conclusion
In this paper we contribute to the discussion surrounding the fact that male
schooling has recently lagged behind that of female education attainment. We
show that in the steady state equilibrium of a model where a male educational
decision is embedded in a framework of inter-linked frictional labour and mar-
riage markets, the proportion of men who choose to undertake the (costly)
schooling investment can decrease after an exogenous increase in the female
labour market returns (viewed as a proxy for female educational attainment).
With education improving their prospects both in the labour and the mar-
riage market (where marital selection occurs based on male wages), when search-
ing for jobs men react to the expectations set by women. An increase in women’s
labour returns (education) increases their value of being single and hence their
marriage market reservation wage, which in turn affects the reservation wages of
men in the labour market. Crucially, due to the link between the male reserva-
tion wage and equilibrium values of unemployment, their returns to education
are also affected. Only a decrease in the proportion of educated men can restore
the tie-breaking equality between these returns and the cost of schooling, since
a lower fraction of such men leads to a lower female reservation wage. Interest-
ingly, although the constrained sequential job search results in a non-monotonic
male reservation wage function, the above result is robust as it holds for any
range of such wages.
Our analysis points towards a more general feature of models of inter-
connected frictional markets where (i) access to one market is conditional on
the outcome of constrained sequential search in the other market, and (ii) the
prospects in both markets are influenced by an ex-ante costly investment. In
such models, the proportion of agents who undertake the investment is crucial,
and is determined by the equality between the expected returns from this in-
vestment and its cost. If there is a change in an exogenous variable that affects
these expected returns (through the change in the requirements to access the
other market), the fraction of these agents is the only endogenous variable left
to restore the market equilibrium condition.
References
[1] Becker, G., 1991. A Treatise on the Family. Harvard University Press, Cam-
bridge, MA.
17
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3477714
[2] Blau, F., Kahn, L., Waldfogel, J., 2000. Understanding young women’s
marriage decisions: the role of labor and marriage market conditions. In-
dustrial & Labor Relations Review 53: 624-47.
[3] Blundell, R., Costa Dias, M., Meghir, C., Shaw, J., 2016. Female labour
supply, human capital and welfare reform. Econometrica 84 (5): 1705-55.
[4] Bonilla, R., Kiraly, F., 2013. Marriage wage premium in a search equili-
birum. Labour Economics 24: 107–15.
[5] Bonilla, R., Kiraly, F., Wildman, J., 2019. Beauty premium and marriage
premium in search equilibrium: theory and empirical test. International
Economic Review 60: 851-77.
[6] Browning, M., Chiappori, P-A., Weiss, Y., 2014. Economics of the Family.
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.
[7] Chiappori, P-A., Iyigun, M., Weiss, Y., 2009. Investment in schooling and
the marriage market. American Economic Review 99: 1689–1713.
[8] Flinn, C., Mullins, J., 2015. Labour market search and schooling invest-
ment. International Economic Review 56: 359-98.
[9] Goldin, C., Katz, LF., Kuziemko, I., 2006. The homecoming of American
college women: the reversal of the college gender gap. Journal of Economic
Perspectives 20: 133-56.
[10] Gould, ED., Paserman, MD., 2003. Waiting for Mr. Right: rising wage
inequality and declining marriage rates. Journal of Urban Economics 53:
257-81.
[11] Grossbard-Shechtman, SA., Neuman, S., 2003. Marriage and work for pay.
In: Grossbard-Shechtman, SA. (Ed.), Marriage and the Economy. Cam-
bridge University Press. Cambridge, UK.
[12] Ludwig, V., Bru¨derl, J., 2018. Is there a male marital wage premium?
New evidence from the United States. American Sociological Review 83
(4): 744-70.
[13] Oppenheimer, VK., 1988. A theory of marriage timing. The American Jour-
nal of Sociology 94: 563-91.
[14] Oppenheimer VK , Lew, V., 1995. American marriage formation in the
1980s: how important was women’s economic independence? In: Oppen-
heim Mason, K., Jensen, AM. (Eds.), Gender and Family Change in Indus-
trialized Countries. Clarendon Press, Oxford, UK.
18
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3477714
APPENDIX - Proof of Proposition 1
First, consider T ∈ (T̂i, wi] . Assume for a moment that Ri(T ) ≤ T . Then,
using V Si (Ri) = Ri/(r + δ) = Ui, the male reservation wage Ri(T ) is given by:
Ri(T ) =
λ0
r + δ
wi∫
Ri
[1− Fi(w)] dw + λ0λn [1− Fi(T )]
(r + δ)(r + λn+ δ)
y.
From the above, Ri(T̂i) = T̂i, where T̂i as defined in (3). Call this reservation
wage R̂i. Also, from the above, when T ≥ wi we have Ri(T ) = Ri, since then
Fi(T ) = 1. It is easy to show that T̂i < wi, and Ri(T ) is decreasing in T . Hence,
Ri(T ) < T iff T > T̂i. For T ≤ T̂i, the reservation function derived above does
not survive as an optimal strategy. Consider then T ∈ (Ri, T̂i]. Unemployed
men are still not marriageable, and the value of being a single unemployed with
a reservation wage Ri > T is given by:
(r + δ)Ui =
λ0
r + δ
wi∫
Ri
[1− Fi(w)]dw + λ0λn
(r + δ)(r + δ + λn)
y.
On the other hand, when choosing T as the reservation wage, this value is given
by:
(r + δ)Ui =
λ0
r + δ
wi∫
T
[1− Fi(w)]dw + λ0λn
(r + δ)(r + δ + λn)
y.
For Ri > T , the latter is higher than the former. Intuitively, the only reason to
increase Ri above Ri would be in order to become marriageable. But Ri = T is
already enough for that.
Next, consider T ≤ Ri. If men believe they are marriageable irrespective of
their employment status, they choose Ri = Ri both when single and married.
This is because V Si (w) =
w
r+δ +
λn
(r+δ+λn)(r+δ)y for all w ≥ Ri. For T ≤ Ri,
they are indeed always marriageable. Now consider the case with T > wi. We
have 1−Fi(T ) = 0, and therefore a man of type i can never get married, as the
highest available wage is wi. Men optimally set Ri(T ) = Ri.
Finally, T̂H > T̂L and RH > RL follow from the fact that FH(.) first order
stochastically dominates FL(.). QED
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